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ABSTRACT—The Supreme Court’s Bostock v. Clayton County opinion, 
affirming that Title VII’s sex discrimination protections extend to “gay 
and transgender” employees, is an opinion emphatically grounded in a 
textualism-based analysis. It is also an opinion that does not once mention 
bisexuals in its text. 
  The bisexual erasure in the opinion is not unusual; in the nearly 
quarter century leading up to Bostock, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
failed to explicitly acknowledge the existence or equal rights of bisexuals. 
While bi erasure in Supreme Court cases is not new, in the case of 
Bostock, the problematic nature of omitting bisexuals from the text of the 
opinion takes on an additional and ironic dimension: Those seeking to 
apply Bostock’s holding to bisexuals must contend with a unique tension 
between the majority opinion’s textualism emphasis and the need to read 
beyond the literal text of the holding’s limited “gay and transgender” 
language to ensure that it applies to bisexuals as well.  
 Along with calling for greater bi inclusivity, this Essay offers an 
interpretive guide to ensuring Bostock’s precedent, textualist emphasis 
notwithstanding, is extended to bisexuals. While resolving such tensions, 
the Essay also describes how systemic bi erasure in LGBTQ rights cases 
beyond Bostock remains a significant problem. In doing so, it explains the 
reciprocal benefits of being bi-inclusive, including the role bisexuals can 
play in illustrating that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex 
discrimination.  
 
AUTHOR—Attorney in Southern California and cofounder of BiLaw, the 
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students. I am grateful to Ezra Young for his invaluable feedback and for 
his own leadership and advocacy for positive and meaningful “BT” 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States entered into a new era of Supreme Court LGBTQ1 
rights jurisprudence with Justice Kennedy’s retirement in 2018. Until his 
retirement, Justice Kennedy was the author of every Supreme Court 
decision affirming LGBTQ rights while he was on the bench and was thus 
a particularly critical swing vote and voice in LGBTQ rights cases.2 The 
confirmation of two new Justices, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, compounded 
uncertainty about how the new Court would rule on LGBTQ rights cases 
that come before it. However, the Court’s 6–3 decision in Bostock v. 
Clayton County3 handed the LGBTQ rights movement a somewhat 
unexpected victory.4 
 Despite the clumsy and tone-deaf “homosexual and transgender” 
vernacular used by Justice Gorsuch5—as compared to the equal-dignity-
embracing opinions authored by Justice Kennedy in past sexual 
orientation discrimination cases6—the Bostock opinion was reassuring in 
its affirmation of employment discrimination protections for gay and 
 
 1 In this Essay, “LGBTQ” is intended to include not just lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender 
people, but other sexual minorities as well such as intersex people, pansexual people, and those of 
other minority sexual orientations and gender identities. 
 2 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see also Alicia 
Parlapiano & Jugal K. Patel, With Kennedy’s Retirement, The Supreme Court Loses its Center, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06/27/us/politics/kennedy-
retirement-supreme-court-median.html [https://perma.cc/K3DJ-UT84] (providing an overview of 
Justice Kennedy’s votes in landmark cases). 
 3 Bostock v. Clayton County, (U.S. Sup. Ct. Case No. 17-1618), Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda 
(U.S. Sup. Ct. Case No. 17-1623); R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity 
Comm’n (U.S. Sup. Ct. Case No. 18-107), consolidated as Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 
1731 (2020) (collectively, “Bostock”). 
 4 See Adam Liptak, Civil Rights Law Protects Gay and Transgender Workers, Supreme Court 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/15/us/gay-transgender-
workers-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/89N5-H3Q2]. 
 5 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738, 1747, 1749, 1751. 
 6 See, e.g., Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 657–66, 677–81; Windsor, 570 U.S. at 764, 768–71; 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, 575. 
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transgender people. After framing the issue as “whether an employer can 
fire someone simply for being homosexual or transgender,” the Court 
concluded, “[t]he answer is clear. An employer who fires an individual 
for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions 
it would not have questioned in members of a different sex.”7 Repeating 
the holding at the end of the opinion, the Court at least substituted “gay” 
for “homosexual,” concluding that “[a]n employer who fires an individual 
merely for being gay or transgender defies the law.”8 
Yet, bisexuals, who were omitted from the Court’s “homosexual and 
transgender” and “gay and transgender” framing, are left struggling to 
reconcile conflicting emotions in the aftermath of Bostock’s release: relief 
that the Court affirmed Title VII sex discrimination protection9 for sexual 
minorities, and dismay at the bisexual erasure in the framing and 
subsequent media coverage of the opinion. As a result, bisexual attorneys 
are forced to expend a frustrating amount of energy reassuring other 
members of the bi community that bisexuals are protected under the law 
along with gay and transgender people, despite Bostock’s failure to 
explicitly include us in its text.10 
Part I of this Essay explores the problem of transcending Bostock’s 
bisexual erasure and explains why, despite the opinion’s textualist 
emphasis and the bisexual erasure in the text of Bostock, the Court’s 
affirmation of Title VII protection against employment discrimination in 
Bostock nonetheless applies to bisexual employees. Namely, this Part 
discusses how canons of case law interpretation counsel in favor of 
including bisexuals; how the opinion’s analytical grounds for protecting 
gay and transgender individuals extend to bisexual individuals; how 
nothing in the opinion indicates it is meant to be read narrowly to exclude 
bisexuals; and how Supreme Court cases from the past quarter century 
have been interpreted to apply to bisexuals even without explicit 
acknowledgement of bi individuals. Part II then addresses the harms that 
flow from bisexual erasure, including the increased burden put on 
 
 7 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737. 
 8 Id. at 1754. 
 9 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
 10 See Heron Greenesmith, Supreme Court LGBTQ Protections Cover Bisexual and Pansexual 
Workers, Too, TEEN VOGUE (June 18, 2020), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/supreme-court-
lgbtq-protections-bisexual-pansexual-workers [https://perma.cc/5J2Y-QGEK] (explaining that 
Bostock’s protections extend to bisexual and pansexual employees but that this erasure by the Court 
and media is nonetheless harmful). Indeed, one individual in the bi community expressed concern 
after reading the opinion stating, “I am seriously wondering if bisexual people are included in 
yesterday’s ruling, because I haven’t heard that identity mentioned once in any reporting or reading 
of the opinion.” Id. 
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bisexual litigants, the perpetuation of bisexual stereotypes, and the 
tangible harms resulting from bisexuals’ lack of formal recognition and 
support. The effects of bi erasure also extend beyond the bisexual 
community, for example, by undermining the integrity of LGBTQ rights 
arguments. Finally, Part III argues that in failing to address bisexuality 
the Court squandered an opportunity to describe with more clarity and 
cohesiveness how sexual orientation discrimination is, in fact, a form of 
sex discrimination. 
I. TRANSCENDING TEXTUALIST TENSIONS IN APPLYING BOSTOCK TO 
BISEXUALS  
There is an immediate irony-soaked problem with trying to 
minimize the harm of the Court’s bi erasure in Bostock with the argument 
that, even if bisexuality is not mentioned in the text of the majority 
opinion, the Court surely intended its ruling to extend to bisexuals. The 
irony of such platitudes encouraging bi people to overlook the literal text 
of the Bostock holding is that Bostock is a textualism-embracing opinion 
to an extreme. To the anguish of conservative legal theorists, the opinion 
even divorces textualism from originalism in its adamance that where text 
is unambiguous, interpretation must stop at the plain meaning and not 
consider legislative intent.11 For example, in rejecting the dissenters’ 
arguments about what Title VII’s drafters may have intended to cover, the 
majority opinion admonished that “[w]hen the express terms of a statute 
give us one answer and extratextual considerations suggest another, it’s 
no contest. Only the written word is the law, and all persons are entitled 
to its benefit.”12 
As such, the fact that the text of Bostock’s holding only explicitly 
acknowledges protections for “gay and transgender” people seems a 
legitimate source of concern for bisexuals, considering the ruling was 
based on a textualist analysis that emphasized not reading beyond the text 
in statutory interpretation. That said, there are several reasons for 
bisexuals to be reassured that the rights affirmed in Bostock should, and 
in fact do, trickle down to bisexuals, even if the Court did not explicitly 
say so. 
First, the canons of statutory interpretation that demand strict plain-
language textualism in the face of unambiguous language do not govern 
case law interpretation. There are no comparable canons of common law 
 
 11 See Tim Ryan, Legal Theory Debate Rages After High Court LGBT Ruling, COURTHOUSE 
NEWS SERV. (June 17, 2020), https://www.courthousenews.com/legal-theory-debate-rages-after-
high-court-lgbt-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/8E73-6BP5]. 
 12 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737. 
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or case law interpretations proscribing strict textualism, or, conversely, 
prohibiting interpreting the holding of a case in light of its surrounding 
context. Thus, while the dicta and procedural history of a case may not 
have the precedential weight of the law that a holding does, when an 
appellate court affirms or reverses a ruling, it is impossible to interpret 
the word “affirm” or “reverse” without consideration of what it is that is 
being affirmed or reversed, i.e., the lower court opinion. For example, it 
is a pertinent and permissible consideration that Bostock explicitly 
affirmed the Second Circuit’s en banc ruling in Zarda v. Altitude Express, 
Inc., which did not single out only gay and transgender people for 
protection under Title VII, but rather affirmed more generally that “sexual 
orientation discrimination is an actionable subset of sex discrimination.”13 
Thus, since Zarda broadly includes sexual orientation discrimination as 
sex discrimination, so does Bostock in affirming Zarda. 
Second, other than the “gay and transgender” language, there is 
nothing in the opinion indicating that the Court intended it to be 
interpreted narrowly or limited to the facts of the case at hand. In fact, 
despite the Court’s embrace of textualism in statutory interpretation, the 
Court balances textualism with a healthy dose of label flexibility in its 
discussion of how the law is applied. The Bostock majority explains that 
“[a]s enacted, Title VII prohibits all forms of discrimination because of 
sex, however they may manifest themselves or whatever other labels 
might attach to them.”14 The Court’s consideration of “whatever other 
labels might attach” acknowledges that those labels listed and discussed 
in the opinion are not exhaustive and therefore allows for more identities, 
including bisexuality, to be protected. In the same vein, Bostock will 
likely be applied beyond the context of employment discrimination as 
well; its analysis extends to other applications, such as anti-discrimination 
protections in educational and health care settings.15 
And, third, if the Court’s use of label flexibility wasn’t convincing, 
the underlying analysis of the opinion logically extends beyond gay and 
transgender people, to both bisexuals and other sexual minorities. This 
includes the Court’s explanation that sexual orientation discrimination is 
sex discrimination because “homosexuality and transgender status are 
inextricably bound up with sex” and thus “to discriminate on these 
 
 13 883 F.3d 100, 132 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 14 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1747. 
 15 See Julie Moreau, Supreme Court’s LGBTQ Ruling Could Have ‘Broad Implications,’ Legal 
Experts Say, NBC NEWS (June 23, 2020, 3:40 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-
out/supreme-court-s-lgbtq-ruling-could-have-broad-implications-legal-n1231779 [https://perma.cc/
5BZL-BZK9]. 
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grounds requires an employer to intentionally treat individual employees 
differently because of their sex.”16 As the Court illustrates, in the context 
of a job application requiring an applicant to check a “homosexual” or 
“transgender” box, 
[t]here is no way for an applicant to decide whether to check the homosexual 
or transgender box without considering sex. To see why, imagine an 
applicant doesn’t know what the words homosexual or transgender mean. 
Then try writing out instructions for who should check the box without using 
the words man, woman, or sex (or some synonym). It can’t be done. 
Likewise, there is no way an employer can discriminate against those who 
check the homosexual or transgender box without discriminating in part 
because of an applicant’s sex.17 
The same, by logical extension, is true of other sexual minorities, 
including bisexuals. And when a bisexual person is discriminated against 
for having a picture of her same-sex partner on her desk, it is unlikely that 
a person will stop to clarify whether she is bisexual or gay before 
discriminating against her. It is her sex in relation to her female romantic 
partner that triggers the discrimination, not necessarily where precisely 
she lies on the sexual orientation “Kinsey scale.”18 
A fourth and more cynical reason that bisexual people should not be 
concerned is that bisexuals have frequently been rendered invisible in 
LGBTQ rights cases,19 but they have nonetheless been understood to be 
 
 16 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1742; see also id. at 1742–43 (rejecting pretextual “it was really sexual 
orientation” defenses against sex discrimination claims, because discrimination against gay and 
transgender employees necessarily takes their sex into account, and Title VII only requires that 
discrimination be “in part because of sex” to establish liability). 
 17 Id. at 1746. 
 18 That said, allegations of pure sexual orientation discrimination also do not preclude a Title VII 
claim from being actionable, due to the Title VII causation standard allowing for multiple factors, as 
discussed herein. For more on the history and meaning of the Kinsey scale and other ways of defining 
bisexuality and sexual orientation, see Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 
52 STAN. L. REV. 353, 380–81 (2000) (including a description of the “Kinsey scale” which depicts a 
continuum of sexual orientation). 
 19 See Nancy C. Marcus, Bridging Bisexual Erasure in LGBT-Rights Discourse and Litigation, 
22 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 291, 306–15, 343–44 (2015) (documenting how bisexuals have been 
excluded from the majority of briefs and opinions of LGBTQ rights cases since Romer). Bisexuals 
were referenced over a dozen times between the briefs and decision for the 1995 Supreme Court case 
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995). Brief for 
Respondent, Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (No. 
94-749), 1995 WL 143532. But from Romer onward bisexuals have almost never been mentioned. 
517 U.S. 620 (1996); see, e.g., Boy Scouts v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 
(2013); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015); see also infra notes 28–31 and accompanying 
text discussing Romer. Similarly, bisexuals and bisexuality have almost never been mentioned in 
federal appellate decisions and briefs in LBGTQ rights cases. See Marcus, supra, at 311–15. 
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equally protected by such “gay rights” opinions.20 When bisexual 
existence is deemed unworthy of mention, bi erasure is itself also deemed 
insignificant, particularly by those who do not comprehend bisexuality as 
an equally valid and independent sexual orientation in the first place, as 
opposed to just a variant of or phase on the way to becoming a “real” 
gay.21 As such, because neither bisexual existence nor erasure is accorded 
significant weight in the grander doctrinal scheme, bisexuals are told not 
to worry, that they can always scurry under the broader “gay rights” and 
“gay and transgender rights” umbrellas even if they were not explicitly 
invited to seek shelter through legal doctrine acknowledging them along 
with the rest of the LGBTQ community. 
Each of these arguments provide solid grounds for interpreting 
Bostock as extending beyond the specific classes of sexual minorities 
named in the opinion. And each can and should be made in response to 
those who try to limit the reach of Bostock to only gay and transgender 
employees in the future. 
Indeed, such issues may arise in a pending case involving a bisexual 
seeking Title VII protection, Breiner v. Board of Education,22 in which a 
bisexual teacher was allegedly fired because of his bisexual orientation. 
The case is currently pending at the federal appellate level after the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky denied Breiner’s claim 
prior to the Bostock decision.23 In doing so, the court explained that the 
Sixth Circuit in Vickers v. Fairfield had previously declined to recognize 
sexual orientation as a prohibited basis for discrimination under Title 
 
 20 This phenomenon is evidenced by the media reports following the Court’s opinion in Bostock. 
Several outlets referred to the opinion as a victory for “lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender” people 
without realizing that the opinion did not explicitly mention bisexuals. See Ryan Thoreson, US 
Supreme Court Ruling a Victory for LGBT Workers, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 15, 2020, 4:03 PM), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/15/us-supreme-court-ruling-victory-lgbt-workers [https://per
ma.cc/K37V-RMC7]; see also Rebecca L. Baker & Caroline Melo, Supreme Court Rules Title VII 
Bars Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, NAT’L L. REV. (June 
15, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-rules-title-vii-bars-discrimination-
basis-sexual-orientation-and [https://perma.cc/2C6N-FUAN] (explaining that the Court’s holding 
“protects lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender workers” from employment discrimination under 
Title VII); Spencer Bokat-Lindell, Opinion, Why the Supreme Court Ruling on L.G.T.B.Q. Rights Is 
Such a Big Deal, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/16/opinion/lgbt-
trans-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/QG26-XNT9] (mentioning that the opinion meant 
employers could not “fire someone for being gay, bisexual or transgender”). 
 21 See generally Yoshino, supra note 18 (discussing roots of bisexual erasure by both 
heterosexual and homosexual communities). 
 22 See No. 5:18-351, 2019 WL 454117, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 25, 2019), appeal filed, No. 19-5123 
(6th Cir. Feb. 28, 2019) (Mr. Breiner’s name was misspelled in the district court as Briener, but has 
been corrected to throughout).  
 23 Id. 
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VII.24 The district court, however, flagged language in a subsequent Sixth 
Circuit case acknowledging “practical problems” with such a limiting 
approach to Title VII, but nonetheless explained that the Vickers ruling 
“remains controlling authority unless an inconsistent decision of the 
United States Supreme Court requires modification of the decision or this 
Court sitting en banc overrules the prior decision.”25 Bostock had not yet 
been decided when those words were written, so the stage is clearly set 
for the Sixth Circuit to revisit Title VII’s sexual orientation discrimination 
coverage, and in a case involving a bisexual plaintiff, no less. 
II.  THE HARMS OF BI ERASURE IN BOSTOCK AND BEYOND 
In my experience writing about the problem of bisexual erasure over 
the years, I have frequently been asked why it even matters that bisexuals 
are erased from LGBTQ rights cases. Indeed, I can well imagine one 
reading this Essay asking: So what? Why does it matter that bisexuals 
were not deemed worthy of mention in Bostock? What’s the real harm in 
bisexuals not being mentioned a single time in the majority opinion, 
including in the Court’s ultimate holding? How does it seriously hurt 
anyone that it was only Justice Alito’s and Justice Kavanaugh’s dissents, 
not even the majority opinion, that acknowledged that sexual orientation 
includes bisexuality?26 
The most immediate harms are plentiful. As set forth in Part I, unlike 
gay and transgender litigants, bisexuals seeking Title VII sex 
discrimination protections cannot make their case by simply quoting 
Bostock’s holding that “[a]n employer who fires an individual merely for 
being gay or transgender defies the law.”27 Bostock’s omission of 
bisexuals forces advocates into a complicated and messy posture, having 
to explain how it is that in an opinion based on textualism, it does not 
matter that bisexuals are not included in the opinion’s text. The fact that 
bisexuals and their advocates must overcome additional hurdles that gay 
and transgender litigants do not face is inequitable. Such additional 
burdens relegate bisexuals to second class status, requiring them to 
explain away their own erasure in Bostock. These additional, inequitable 
burdens would not have emanated from a decision that explicitly included 
 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. (citing Tumminello v. Father Ryan High Sch., Inc., 678 F. App’x 281, 285 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 13 S. Ct. 121 (2017)). 
 26 See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1758 n.8 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 
1830 n.6 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (both citing to definitions of sexual orientation that explicitly 
include bisexuality). 
 27 Id. at 1754 (majority opinion). 
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bisexuals in its coverage, or one that at least framed its holding in broader 
terms of sexual orientation and gender identity or LGBTQ people. 
These concerns—that future defendants in bisexual discrimination 
cases must rely on the “gay and transgender”-specific language of 
Bostock to prove their case—has turned celebration to trepidation for 
bisexual Court-watchers. While the rest of the LGBTQ community 
celebrates Bostock, some bisexuals have responded to the decision with 
uncertainty about the repercussions of the Court’s failure to acknowledge 
their existence and rights.28 
This is not a new problem. In failing to mention bisexuals, Bostock 
continues a harmful tradition of bisexual erasure in Supreme Court 
opinions, a problem beginning with the Court’s 1996 decision in Romer 
v. Evans. Prior to Romer—in which the Supreme Court struck down an 
amendment to the Colorado Constitution, Amendment 2, that barred local 
governments from treating “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual” citizens as 
a protected class29—Supreme Court opinions were comparatively bi-
inclusive.30 That changed with Romer, when the Court chose to redefine 
the class of persons affected by Amendment 2 as “only gay people,” even 
though the text of Amendment 2 explicitly prohibited civil rights 
discrimination based on “homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, 
conduct, practices or relationships.”31 Subsequent LGBTQ rights 
Supreme Court decisions have similarly failed to mention bisexuals by 
name.32 
In Bostock, reminiscent of Romer, the Supreme Court ignored 
bisexuality in its analysis, in part following the lead of some of the 
attorneys in that case. The attorneys for Mr. Bostock, for example, failed 
to acknowledge the existence of bisexuals even once in their petition for 
writ of certiorari, framing the case instead as one that affects “all the gay 
and lesbian workers across [the] country,”33 urging the Court to end 
workplace discrimination against “[g]ay and [l]esbian [e]mployees.”34 
Such bi-erasing language made it all the easier for the Court to 
 
 28 See Greenesmith, supra note 10. 
 29 517 U.S. 620, 624, 626 (1996). 
 30 See supra note 19.  
 31 See Marcus, supra note 19, at 307. 
 32 See id. at 306–15, 343–44 (documenting the bi erasure in court opinions over the decades). 
 33 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (No. 
17-1618).  
 34 Id. at 26. 
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subsequently further abbreviate the class of persons affected by its ruling 
as homosexual/gay and transgender people.35 
This is not just a problem of semantics; the more courts do not 
explicitly acknowledge the existence of bisexuals the less willing 
attorneys may be to bring discrimination cases on their behalf. 
Reciprocally, the fewer cases are brought on behalf of bisexuals, the less 
likely court opinions are to be bi-inclusive. This perpetual cycle of bi 
erasure makes it difficult to find any case law addressing discrimination 
against bisexuals, even though they are explicitly included in many state 
discrimination statutes.36 
The harms stemming from Bostock’s bi erasure extend farther than 
the opinion itself, as it compounds the serious harms that emanate from 
bi erasure in general. The failure of courts to recognize bisexuality as a 
valid sexual orientation can have tragic, even life-or-death, repercussions. 
Too often, for example, bisexual parents are subjected to negative custody 
or adoption determinations when their bisexual orientation is unjustly 
conflated with instability.37 Additionally, in the context of immigration 
and asylum, bisexual asylees seeking refuge from countries that persecute 
people for their sexual orientation have been disbelieved and treated with 
suspicion by asylum adjudicators who do not consider bisexuality as a 
valid sexual orientation.38 Such adjudicators have penalized bisexual 
asylees for not being “gay enough,” at times denying them asylum and 
sending them back to the countries where they faced persecution for their 
sexual orientation.39 Finally, in criminal cases, misapprehension of 
 
 35 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737, 1741–49, 1751, 1753. 
 36 See generally Jerome Hunt, A State-by-State Examination of Nondiscrimination Laws and 
Policies, CTR. AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND (2012) (cataloging the twenty-two states that explicitly 
include bisexuals in their antidiscrimination statutes); see also Ann E. Tweedy & Karen Yescavage, 
Employment Discrimination Against Bisexuals: An Empirical Study, 21 WM. & MARY J. RACE, 
GENDER, & SOC. JUST., 699, 709–10 (2015) (documenting the lack of published cases addressing 
claims by bisexuals, and explaining that even in employment discrimination cases involving claims 
by bisexual plaintiffs, “it seems to be virtually unheard of for a bisexual plaintiff to succeed in such 
a claim on the merits”). 
 37 See Marcus, supra note 19, at 318–20; RUTH COLKER, HYBRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS, 
AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER AMERICAN LAW 39(1996); Patricia M. Logue, The Rights of Lesbian 
and Gay Parents and Their Children, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 95, 95 (2002) (discussing non-
heterosexual custody cases almost exclusively in terms of gay and lesbian individuals, not bisexuals). 
 38 See Marcus, supra note 19, at 316–18; Thom Senzee, Bisexual Seeking Asylum Resorts to 
Photos When Asked to Prove It, ADVOCATE (May 11, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.advocate.com/
world/2015/05/10/bisexual-asylum-seeker-humiliated-trying-prove-sexuality-uk-officials-0 
[https://perma.cc/VED2-WYNS]; Joe Morgan, Mother of Bisexual Asylum Seeker Will Sue Britain if 
They Send Her Son Home to Die, GAY STAR NEWS (Apr. 24, 2015), https://www.gaystarnews.com/
article/mother-bisexual-asylum-seeker-will-sue-britain-if-they-send-her-son-home-die240415/ 
[https://perma.cc/8CBH-BFH9]. 
 39 See Marcus, supra note 19, at 316–18. 
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bisexuality can have dire consequences, as bisexual defendants risk losing 
their freedom when judges, prosecutors, or jurors view bisexuality as an 
indicator of deceptiveness and, by extension, criminal behavior.40 
The stigma of bisexual erasure can have other grave consequences 
as well. Bisexuals already suffer from a comparative lack of community 
and resources and disproportionately high rates of employment 
discrimination and pay disparity, mental and physical health problems, 
suicide and suicidal ideation rates, and violence—including intimate 
partner violence, domestic violence, rape and sexual assault.41 Bi erasure 
compounds such disparities as bisexuals internalize the stigma of bi 
erasure and may be subjected to increased violence and hostilities from 
those who do not recognize bisexuality as valid.42 The more bisexuals are 
ignored, and are consequently misunderstood by courts, lawmakers, and 
broader society, the more these dangerous disparities grow. 
Bisexual erasure also hurts the integrity of LGBTQ rights discourse 
by perpetuating false dichotomies, reinforcing inaccurate paradigms that 
require persons to fall under either a gay or straight category to be entitled 
to formal recognition.43 A legal system that serves and reflects the 
 
 40 See Nancy Marcus, Legally Bi: “The Staircase” Tells the Case of an Anti-Bi Bias in Our 
Courts, BI.ORG (Aug. 25, 2018), https://bi.org/en/articles/legally-bi-the-staircase-tells-the-case-of-
an-anti-bi-bias-in-our-courts [https://perma.cc/S6SY-W6JK] (reviewing the Netflix documentary 
film, The Staircase, which documented, among other things, the role that anti-bisexual biases played 
in the murder conviction of American novelist Michael Peterson.) 
 41 See generally MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, INVISIBLE MAJORITY: THE DISPARITIES 
FACING BISEXUAL PEOPLE AND HOW TO REMEDY THEM (2016) [hereinafter INVISIBLE MAJORITY], 
https://www.lgbtmap.org/invisible-majority [https://perma.cc/ZJ8Y-5FM5] (extensively 
documenting statistical evidence of each of these types of disparities, and proposing policy-based 
methods of addressing the disparities); HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN FOUND., BINET USA, BISEXUAL RES. 
CTR. & BISEXUAL ORG. PROJECT, HEALTH DISPARITIES AMONG BISEXUAL PEOPLE, 
https://assets2.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/HRC-BiHealthBrief.pdf?_ga=2.2
41924161.251517611.1592273885-1684528672.1590802494 [https://perma.cc/S97M-6QFA] 
(addressing health disparities faced by bisexuals). 
 42 See INVISIBLE MAJORITY, supra note 41, at 1 (describing the report’s findings in a variety of 
areas as collectively “show[ing] how bias, stigma, discrimination, and invisibility combine to create 
serious negative outcomes for bisexual people,” including “pervasive discrimination and key 
disparities”); id. at 6 (describing how the lack of studies and analyses addressing bisexuals render it 
hard to understand and address the disparities faced by bi people, as undeniable as those disparities 
are); id. at 12 (explaining that “a lack of understanding about bisexuality may mean that an 
immigration official may unfairly discount a bisexual person’s application for asylum by assuming 
that the applicant is actually heterosexual”); id. at 18 (addressing how studies examining health 
outcomes have ignored the needs and experiences of bisexual men, impacting data analysis of HIV 
prevention, treatment, and care). 
 43 For a comprehensive discussion of the “bipolar injustice” of false dichotomies, and how a “bi 
jurisprudence” that sheds light on the flaws of either/or, black-and-white paradigms could also 
provide a model for transcending false dichotomies in other contexts such as race, gender, and 
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existence of all persons, not just those who fall within black-and-white 
polarized binaries, should acknowledge the existence and realities of 
bisexuals and others (including those of nonbinary gender identities, for 
example) who do not fit within rigid binary definitional boxes. 
Moreover, bisexual erasure undermines the bedrock principles upon 
which LGBTQ rights advocacy often rests. For example, the historic 
Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell decisions were grounded in 
principles of equal dignity, principles advocated for by LGBTQ rights 
attorneys and embraced by the Court. In the context of sexual orientation, 
these cases eschewed second-class treatment of gay people and same-sex 
couples (even while, as described, erasing bi people) in favor of equal 
respect, autonomy, and dignity.44 Emphasizing those principles broadly in 
LGBTQ rights advocacy, while simultaneously not protecting with equal 
force the equal dignity and respect to bisexuals, ultimately hurts not just 
bisexuals, but also the consistency and coherence of LGBTQ rights 
arguments.45 
Finally, the bisexual erasure in Bostock’s text costs the Court its own 
credibility, as it is a dishonest reframing of the issue at its core. An 
analysis of the Court’s reasoning in Lawrence v. Texas, which overruled 
the infamous Bowers v. Hardwick decision—a 1986 decision that upheld 
sodomy bans as constitutional after reframing the issue to be 
inappropriately homosexuality-specific by asking whether individuals 
had a “fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy”46—provides 
an apt illustration of how Bostock, like Bowers, harms the Court’s 
credibility. In Lawrence, the Court condemned the underlying Bowers 
analysis, beginning with the Bowers Court’s initial improper reframing of 
the question presented. As the Lawrence Court described Bowers: 
The Court began its substantive discussion in Bowers as follows: ‘The issue 
presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right 
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of 
the many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a 
 
disability, see generally COLKER, supra note 37, at 15–232. Professor Colker’s model for using a “bi 
jurisprudence” as a tool for deconstructing harmful and false dichotomies could be applied in myriad 
other contexts as well. 
 44 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 657–66, 677–81 (2015); United States v. Windsor, 
570 U.S. 744, 764, 768–75 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567, 575 (2003). 
 45 See Marcus, supra note 19, at 324–36 (describing how bi erasure in legal argument harms the 
broader LGBTQ community, resulting in statistical inaccuracies in legal argument, the perpetuation 
of false dichotomies and isolationist paradigms, the undermining of equal liberty arguments, and 
missed opportunities in refining legal analyses). 
 46 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Notably, the 
text of the statute at issue in that case, Ga. Code Ann. § 16–6–2 (1984), did not restrict its sodomy 
ban to only gay, or homosexual, people. See id. at 188 n.1. 
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very long time.’ That statement, we now conclude, discloses the Court’s 
own failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake.47  
Such a narrow framing had allowed the Bowers Court to mock the claim 
to the liberty interests at issue in that case as “at best, facetious.”48 
In the opening paragraph of Bostock, the Court similarly 
misrepresents the question at issue in the sexual orientation cases as 
“whether an employer can fire someone simply for being homosexual or 
transgender.”49 However, the actual question presented in Bostock and 
Zarda was “[w]hether discrimination against an employee because of 
sexual orientation constitutes prohibited employment discrimination 
‘because of . . . sex’ within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.”50 In reframing the issue in overly specific “homosexual and 
transgender” terms, the Court invites ridicule of the issue in the case as 
facetious in its overly narrow (and antiquated) “homosexual and 
transgender” framing. And, perhaps even more important, in reframing 
the issue that was asked of it in such narrow terms, the Court peddles in 
inaccuracy, because that, quite simply, was not the question asked of the 
Court.  
In the end, bisexual erasure has created hurdle after hurdle, in legal 
contexts and otherwise, for bisexuals seeking fair and just treatment under 
the law. The Bostock holding, while certainly a victory for LGBTQ 
equality overall, is at the same time yet another inequitable hurdle in the 
path of bisexual advocacy. 
III. HOW BI INCLUSION COULD HAVE BUTTRESSED THE BOSTOCK 
ANALYSIS 
Omitting bisexuality from the analysis of Title VII’s protections for 
LGBTQ people also results in a flawed analysis and, reciprocally, a 
missed opportunity to illustrate how sexual orientation discrimination is 
a form of sex discrimination, i.e., the central issue in Bostock. 
 
 47 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566–67 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190). 
 48 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194; see also Nancy C. Marcus, Beyond Romer and Lawrence: The Right 
to Privacy Comes Out of the Closet, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 355, 395–98 (2006) (explaining that 
the application of strict “fundamental rights” semantics in due process jurisprudence both endangers 
individual rights and is inconsistent with Supreme Court substantive due process precedent). 
 49 Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020). 
 50 Question Presented, Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (No. 17-1618), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/17-01618qp.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7WD-N4Y2]; see also 
Question Presented, Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, No. 17-1623, https://www.supremecourt.gov
/qp/17-01623qp.pdf [https://perma.cc/QTM4-5WZW] (presenting the same issue as, and 
consolidated with, Bostock). 
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Keeping in mind that the Court in Bostock rejected the employers’ 
formulation of the Title VII “but-for” analysis that sex is the only 
causative factor in an adverse employment action,51 bisexuals could 
nonetheless be quite instrumental in debunking even those poorly framed 
“but-for” arguments. The Bostock majority describes the employer 
argument as follows: 
The employers illustrate their concern with an example. When we apply the 
simple [“but-for”] test to Mr. Bostock—asking whether Mr. Bostock, a man 
attracted to other men, would have been fired had he been a woman—we 
don’t just change his sex. Along the way, we change his sexual orientation 
too (from homosexual to heterosexual). If the aim is to isolate whether a 
plaintiff’s sex caused the dismissal, the employers stress, we must hold 
sexual orientation constant—meaning we need to change both his sex and 
the sex to which he is attracted. So, for Mr. Bostock, the question should be 
whether he would’ve been fired if he were a woman attracted to women. 
And because his employer would have been as quick to fire a lesbian as it 
was a gay man, the employers conclude, no Title VII violation has 
occurred.52 
As the majority in Bostock points out, this argument is 
fundamentally flawed because it improperly assumes a single factor 
causation standard, which is not the requirement under Title VII.53 
However, including bisexuals at this point in the analysis would have 
revealed another glaring hole in the employers’ argument: even under 
their wishfully thought-up single-cause framework, in the case of the 
bisexual employee discriminated against because of her or her partner’s 
sex, every factor really is constant other than sex. To elaborate, when a 
female bisexual employee is discriminated against because her partner is 
female, but a male bisexual employee with a female partner is not 
similarly discriminated against, sex is the only variance between the two 
scenarios, while sexual orientation is held constant. Similarly, if a 
bisexual employee is discriminated against when her partner is female, 
but not when she has a male partner, once again, sex is the only thing that 
changed from one scenario to the next. Everything else is 
constant, including the bi employee’s sexual orientation. Thus, bisexuals 
can provide a clear depiction of how sexual orientation discrimination 
 
 51 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739–40 (explaining that under Title VII, a plaintiff can prevail by 
showing that sex was just one “motivating factor” in an adverse employment decision, but even under 
a “but-for” causation analysis, discrimination is actionable where more than one factor contributed 
to a negative employment decision). 
 52 Id. at 1747–48. 
 53 Id. at 1739–40, 1748–49.  
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really is a form of prohibited sex discrimination, rebutting arguments to 
the contrary. 
This is just one example of how bi inclusion can strengthen LGBTQ 
rights discourse, advocacy, and jurisprudence. More generally, bi 
inclusion resolves the problems of bi erasure, while further strengthening 
LGBTQ rights discourse through a more honest and inclusive approach 
that rejects the rigid and confining identity-erasing categorizations from 
which LGBTQ people as a whole have long sought their liberty. 
CONCLUSION 
Why did the Bostock decision fail to even acknowledge the existence 
of bisexuals along with gay and transgender employees? It was not solely 
because of the parties’ particular identities in that case, as the question 
presented in Bostock and Zarda was about sexual orientation generally, 
not solely about the particular plaintiffs’ sexual orientations.54 Indeed, Mr. 
Bostock’s written and oral arguments were explicitly inclusive of 
lesbians,55 although he is not a lesbian, which begs the question of why 
his petition to the Court did not similarly acknowledge the existence of 
bisexuals. 
Regardless of the reasons why Mr. Bostock’s attorneys made the 
strategic decision to reference “gays and lesbians” but not bisexuals, by 
doing so they signaled the acceptability of bi erasure and led the Court to 
 
 54 As a bit of tangential irony, Mr. Bostock was fired after his employer discovered he was on a 
gay softball league. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737–38. A decade prior, the 2008 Gay Softball World 
Series was the subject of a one-of-a-kind lawsuit filed by the National Center for Lesbian Rights 
against the North American Gay Amateur Athletic Alliance (NAGAAA), which settled the case after 
subjecting three bisexual softball players to hours of intrusive interrogation and discrimination for 
being deemed too “non-gay” to play in the Gay Softball World Series, despite NAGAAA's mission 
statement explicitly “celebrat[ing] inclusivity and stat[ing] that its mission is to promote amateur 
competition ‘for all persons regardless of age, sexual orientation or preference, with special emphasis 
on the participation of members of the gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender (GLBT) community.’” 
Apilado v. N. Am. Gay Amateur Athletic All., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1156, 1159 (W.D. Wash. 2011) 
(emphasis added); see also Parties Settle Case Challenging Disqualification of Bisexual Players’ 
Team at 2008 Gay Softball World Series, NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RTS. (Nov. 28, 2011), 
http://www.nclrights.org/about-us/press-release/parties-settle-case-challenging-disqualification-of-
bisexual-players-team-at-2008-gay-softball-world-series/ [https://perma.cc/C7N9-GNC4]. The court 
held that it was impermissible for the “gay” softball organization to exclude bisexual or heterosexual 
players who were presumed to not “share” the “values” of gay people. See Apilado, 792 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1156. From discussions with lead LGBTQ rights impact litigators and a review of published case 
law, that case appears to have been the only such publicized case brought by an LGBTQ rights 
organization against another LGBTQ organization to assert the rights of bisexuals against 
discrimination by gay people, and it raises the question of whether an employer who discriminates 
against an employee (such as Mr. Bostock) for being on a gay softball league is necessarily 
discriminating against the employee for being gay, as opposed to being bisexual. 
 55 See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text. 
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engage in similar erasure. Such has been the case in LGBTQ rights 
litigation for decades. The Court’s bi erasure in Bostock is just the latest 
example of the bi erasure that has occurred in every LGBTQ rights 
Supreme Court decision since Romer v. Evans.56 
Unfortunately, the Court’s bi erasure in Bostock is not unique. For 
decades, bisexuals have been expected to acquiesce to their erasure and 
quietly accept that the rights explicitly affirmed for their gay and 
transgender friends will trickle down to them as well. And trickle down 
they should: a careful reading of Bostock supports extending its holding 
to bisexuals.  
A better Bostock opinion, however, would have been a bi-inclusive 
opinion that recognizes the role bisexuals can play in illustrating that 
when an employee is treated worse when dating someone of the same sex 
than when dating someone of a different sex, despite being bisexual all 
along, that discrimination is clearly “because” of sex for Title VII 
purposes. 
Without such an explicit recognition of how Title VII’s sex 
discrimination protections also apply to bisexuals—even though Title VII 
should apply to bisexuals as well as to straight and gay people, as do other 
laws that protect against sexual orientation discrimination57—citing 
Bostock for that proposition will not be a straightforward path. The 
holding’s “gay and transgender”-specific language will not be as easy for 
bisexuals to cite as precedential authority for the assertion of rights as it 
will be for gay and transgender people. In future cases, bisexuals may be 
required to add additional layers of argument explaining why the Bostock 
holding should be interpreted as applying equally to them even though it 
only explicitly names gay and transgender people. 
With the Sixth Circuit’s pending reconsideration of Breiner v. Board 
of Education,58 the first federal appellate decision regarding the 
applicability of Title VII and Bostock to bisexual employees may come 
sooner rather than later. While there is no chance of bisexuality being 
erased in Breiner, a case explicitly about a bisexual employee, there is 
still the danger that the defendant may try to use the erasure of bisexuals 
in the text of Bostock as an argument against bisexual employees’ Title 
 
 56 See supra notes 18 and 20 and accompanying text. 
 57 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11139.8(a)(5) (West 2017); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-
301(5)(b), (7) (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 19A, § 43 (West 2018); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 5, § 4553 (9-C) (2019); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645.321(3)(d) (West 2019); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 57-21-2 (23) (West 2015). 
 58 No. 19-5123 (6th Cir.), on appeal from Breiner v. Brd. of Educ., No. 18-351-KKC, 2019 WL 
454117 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 25, 2019). 
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VII protections. For all the reasons detailed herein, that argument should 
not succeed, but Mr. Breiner’s attorneys must be prepared to confront it 
nonetheless. 
Throughout decades of bisexual erasure leading up to Breiner, 
including and long before Bostock, bi people have been consistently 
reminded that our equal dignity may be denied at any turn, our identity 
trivialized or erased entirely, by the bench, the bar, and beyond. 
Hopefully, while Bostock marks the end of unchecked employment 
discrimination against LGBTQ people, Breiner will mark the beginning 
of the end of bisexual erasure. 
It is time. The cumulative stigma of persistent bisexual erasure over 
the decades is crushing with its wearying weight, especially when even 
the lawyers representing LGBTQ clients fail to acknowledge bisexuals’ 
existence and rights. This is a particularly poignant truth when the latest 
blatant erasure by the Supreme Court occurred in an opinion centered on 
the importance of taking text literally and seriously. Words matter, and 
they should be weighed more carefully in the future. The bench and bar 
can do better by bisexuals. 
